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ABSTRACT The broad application spectrum of unmanned aerial vehicles is making them one of the most
promising technologies of Internet of Things era. Proactive prevention for public safety threats is one of
the key areas with vast potential of surveillance and monitoring drones. Antennas play a vital role in such
applications to establish reliable communication in these scenarios. This paper considers line-of-sight and
non-line-of-sight threat scenarios with the perspective of antennas and electromagnetic wave propagation.
INDEX TERMS UAV, surveillance drones, amateur monitoring, antenna and propagation.
I. PRIMER
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have gone through a long
history of technological development, almost as long as the
invention of the airplane by the Wright brothers. Like their
manned counterparts, the earliest UAVs belonged to the mil-
itary and used for training, spying or eliminating a target.
The UAVs have always been part of the aviation history
though buried in oblivion in the yesteryears in contrast to the
flying heroes with chest full of medals telling their glorious
deeds [1]. Recent years have seen them grow significantly in
technology as well as commercial usage [2].
UAVs can fly a few meters from the ground, which can
fill the gap between the low-resolution satellite images and
data acquisition vehicles that rely on the weather effectively.
A specially designed camera on the platform combined with
data cloud can have applications ranging from data acquisi-
tion, surveillance and monitoring, transportation, emergency
relief, infrastructure develop-ment, agriculture and scientific
research [3]. The UAVs enable the construction enterprises
to quantify engineering progress in real time, allow road
network data collection in all directions, help forest fire
fighting, enable fast courier service, allow farmers to con-
tinuously monitor crop growth and allow mining owners to
obtain accurate individual digging information. Energy and
infrastructure companies can thoroughly inspect pipelines,
roads and cables by using the UAVs. Humanitarian organiza-
tions can use the UAVs to quickly assess the affected zone,
adapt to refugee and provide effective relief based on the
collected data. A transport UAV with a load capacity can take
off and land near a building or a human settlement, enabling
developing countries to achieve rapid logistics even with-
out adequate road infrastructure, release the convenience of
e-commerce and development of the national economy
quickly. In developed countries, transport UAVs can help to
achieve better quality of service in crowded or remote areas.
An UAV with inspection function may fly in a confined
space to assist the fire or emergency unit assessing the level of
danger by finding building cracks, road hazards, situation of
bridges and tunnels faster and safer. The UAVs can cross the
complex terrestrial environment easily that is a huge obstruc-
tion for ground robots. For telecom companies, the UAVs can
act as a mobile and temporary private network base station.
Some groups use UAVs instead of manned helicopters to
study volcanic eruptions eliminating the risks of volcanic
eruption and loss of life with obvious advantage [3].
Rapid maturity of microelectronics and materials industry
along with novel miniaturization techniques hasresulted in
unlimited potential for the UAVs. Today, a wide variety of
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FIGURE 1. Common aircraft types and their autonomous control requirements.
drones are in operation to open an era of sharing the sky
with traditional sky owners, the airplanes. Aviation regula-
tions around the world are being updated or supplemented
to accommodate this great change. According to the federal
aviation administration, there will be 10,000 UAVs soaring in
the United States skies alone by 2020, bringing huge benefits
to social economy [4].
II. TYPES OF UAVs
There are various types of amateur drones available in the
market, weighing from a few hundred grams to kilograms [5].
The most common types include fixed-wing, rotor aircraft,
and flapping wing based on the bionic structure [3]. They are
usually powered by batteries or fuel engines. The electrically
driven UAVs are generally low in requirements, are more
reliable and quieter than the one using the fuel engines but
have very short flight distance. Fixed-wing drones are easy
to design, they are cost effective, and they can quickly and
efficiently fly, but usually are very difficult to hover. They
are able to fly longer distances by having larger fixed wings.
A larger wing also increases the load capacity at the expense
of higher takeoff requirements. Helicopters are generally
portable and require less space for take-off. The rotorcraft
can be hovered well, but they are less efficient on forward
flight. The bionic flapping wing provides a possible compro-
mise, but the fluid mechanics and control problems are more
challenging than the first two categories.
Due to the distrust on human operation, many studies
are trying to achieve a complete autonomous UAV where
the UAV itself judges the next action and follows the set
target. In order to achieve this goal and in ensure that the
UAV completes the task in a particular space or near the
ground, the existing mechanical and electronic design will
be completely updated and requires complying with the
autonomic control logic (Fig. 1) [3]. These scene posi-
tioning signals and remote control are often not accurate
enough or difficult to reach. Some preliminary conclusions,
such as underwater electromagnetic wave 3D positioning
studies have been reported [6]. This is a promising direction,
but it requires continuous efforts.
III. STANDARDIZATION REQUIREMENTS
Everything looks good and thriving for the UAVs until public
safety issues are considered due to their small size [7]. Many
UAVs are only about 1 meter in size making them difficult
to be spotted by the airplane pilots. Larger number of drone
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FIGURE 2. Concept of a regulated UAV system based on leaky wave cable and directional antennas to cooperate with SDr to
realize the discovery and control of ADr.
usage also brings serious challenges in air traffic control.
Collision avoidance of theUAVswith other drones and legacy
air traffic is a challenging task. Visible or infrared cameras
provide a cheap and effective technical solution, but the
clouds in the sky limit their scope of application. Breach of
people’s privacy is another major concern by the use of high-
resolution cameras, infrared detectors, and even faces recog-
nition software on the UAV terminal [8]. Some government
regulations require amateur drones to flywithin the operator’s
vision, but this rule ignores the fact that today’s drones allow
you to see their location through mobile phones or computer
screens and even virtual reality devices.
There are huge safety concerns surrounding the UAVs.
Combined with a sharp blade, even a 500g UAVwill generate
enough potential energy to cause a permanent damage to
the fragile human body in the event of an accident or fail-
ure. The US Federal Aviation Administration published a
roadmap in 2013 [3], stating that by 2028 civilian unmanned
aircraft could fly out of the operator’s line of sight and
gradually integrate into the national airspace management
system. Likewise, the British regulations permit flying a UAV
weighing less than 20 kilograms in the crowded area, within
the operator’s line of sight. Although we cannot see that there
is a huge technical barrier to the community to accept more
independent research or commercial UAV control in the next
five years, as a result of the possible changes in government
policy, an autonomous UAV’s flight in the actual environment
may be illegal until 2028 in the United States and Europe.
The 21st century will be in many ways a century of
robotics where the UAVs must and will play an important
role. It is important to address the legal challenges posed by
the development of unmanned air vehicles, including privacy
and airspace safety. Improvements and additions to airspace
managementmaymakeUAVflightsmore orderly, but privacy
and airspace security issues that rely on the law alone may not
be enough, the key is how to implement. Survey [9] proposed
guidelines for privacy protection related models, it can be
used in UAV related research. In the absence of concrete
regulations and standards, commercial usage of the drone
technology is severely daunted.
Due to the lack of regulatory techniques, some too harsh
regulations were introduced. Beginning in 2014, DJI, one of
the world’s leading amateur UAVs manufacturers, began to
update their UAV firmware (the UAV’s brain), in collabora-
tion with the local authorities, airport and the seat of govern-
ment to standardize the UAV operation and set boundaries
for the UAV flight [10]. In case the UAV operators decide
to ignore the restricted airspace warning and continue the
flight (either malicious or just curious), the firmware will
make the UAV unmoved. Some of regulations consider aux-
iliary means of scientific research as ‘‘illegal’’ [11]. Amateur
drones are generally banned from commercial airspace [5].
In fact, the current management has established a double
standard, entertainment users can use the UAVs (often inex-
perienced), but trained researchers cannot. Some researchers
have to use other alternative means, for example, a large kite
to carry the camera to collect data, but such a compromise
has obvious shortcomings, no wind no data. Concept of a
regulated drone system is illustrated in Fig.2. The electronic
fence is consisting of the ground leaky cable and the air
surveillance drones (SDr) that collectively monitor the pos-
sible intruders in the airspace. The nuclear power plant in the
Safety Zone represents the target needed to be protected from
unauthorized drone flights. Three directional antennas placed
in Block Area represent use of directional beam blinding the
incoming UAVs that could invade the Safety Zone of amateur
drone (ADr). The mooring cable in Demilitarized Zone has
a dual frequency attribute, where low frequency waves are
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FIGURE 3. Useful microwave devices for the UAV detection system.
collected for SDr energy, and high frequency constitutes an
electronic fence to detect possible intrusion. The details of
each antenna and radio wave propagation unit are given in
the following sections.
IV. ADr SURVEILLANCE WITH ANTENNA DEVICES
Large majority of existing commercial ADr control works
at a single frequency band of 2.4/5 GHz due to cost issues.
For better perception of suspicious ADr control signal, it is
practical to have a dual-band operation for the SDr using
a dual-band antenna. As shown in the Fig. 3, a dual-band
PIFA antenna operating at 2.4/5 GHz is designed to increase
the sensitivity at 5 GHz as this band is more susceptible
than 2.4 GHz. Dual-band PIFA is an omni-directional antenna
that can be a good monitor of incoming threats in all direc-
tions. Combined electromagnetic noise in the sky is cleaner.
Its low profile design also makes the antenna cost-effective
and easy to integrate. The antenna is embedded in the lower
part of the fuselage in order to better receive the control
signal from the ground. This could be own flight control
signal or possible intruder signal. Antenna has to fulfill three
key tasks; facilitate own communication, perceive suspected
signal in the same airspace, and establishment of the elec-
tronic fence on earth and sky.
Self-communication, as the eye in the sky, requires the
control of the ground station, as the autonomous controlled
aircraft in Fig. 2 remains in the laboratory phase for the
time being. Suspicious command monitoring through mon-
itoring the ADr’s own flight control signal can be useful to
find suspicious objects, rather than using image segmenta-
tion identification or other feature recognition. Stable and
significant characterized flight control signals are easier to
identify than image segmentation. Sky and earth integrated
electronic fence is achieved through the electromagnetic
waves to form an invisible wall (as shown in Fig. 2). Under
normal circumstances, the airspace is clear and the elec-
tronic fence is not much of interference. But when there is
foreign invasion, especially non-biological, will produce a
reflection or scattering of electromagnetic waves disturbing
the system to expose itself.
In Fig.2, the system uses directional Yagi antenna
(25 dBi 16 units) as a deterrent to blind the attacking ADr
into the block area. Use of theYagi antennawith high gain and
narrow beam helps to formmultiple beamswith a high energy
density ‘‘black barrier’’. To cut off the link between the ADr
and its controller, the ‘‘black barrier’’ makes the background
noise power effectively equal to the command’s SNR so that
the command of the intrusion operator is submerged in the
background noise. Multi beam synthesis can be a good block
to the ADr, but also impacts the other objects in the sky
minimum resulting in the SDr to perform its duties properly.
Angle reflector is a smart low profile device that improves
the radar echo and when integrated in the SDr, achieves effec-
tive enemy identification. The aircraft generally considers
airflow line dynamics. For the flying
objects, accuracy of the image resolution is inversely pro-
portional to the distance, and it is obvious that the distance is
too far to be seen. Corner reflectors can amplify SDr echo
characteristics as well as the echo of a mid-size intruding
aircraft. It helps to distinguish between the SDr and ADr, and
it is convenient for directional antennas to aim at targets that
should be aligned.
Power amplifier and frequency multiplier are basic
RF devices. Amplifiers are used to enhance the background
noise power level. If high background noise can be imple-
mented in a certain region, the command of ADr operator is
less effective. Maximum working power of the power ampli-
fier is 8 W, which can cover the whole UAV remote control
band. Frequency multiplier is being used as a frequency dou-
bler enabling the SDr to interfere with two frequency bands
simultaneously using a single signal source.
The proposed antenna system’s usability is established
through measurements of the ADr data. Multi-angle acqui-
sition of the spectral data in two-dimensional plane is noted
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FIGURE 4. Acquisition of electromagnetic spectrum characteristics of UAV from plane to three-dimensional space.
using DEVISER E8000 Spectrum Analyzer and rotating the
directional antenna clockwise as shown in Fig.4 (a). The rotor
is started but not took off in this configuration. The data for
three-dimensional motion of the aircraft in the air, as shown
in Fig.4 (b), is acquired next for experimental repeatability.
The aircraft started the rotor and simulated the free flight
state but cable bound. The measurement photos are shown
in Fig.4 (c). The measured data has exhibited poor repro-
ducibility and correlation especially with change of angles.
It is inferred that since the UAV has its own movement,
the acquisition system also has relative movement. Different
angles, distances, and different environmental backgrounds
have a random effect on the data. High frequency rotor,
which is the source of aircraft power, is different from the
natural environment, so it is more feasible to identify the
electromagnetic characteristics of the whole aircraft and then
to capture the ADr. At the same time, it is proved that the
SDr monitoring ADr flight control command is an effective
early warning method. The control command characteris-
tics are obvious, and the working frequency band is known
making the data collection and observation simple. After
preliminary tests, the electromagnetic spectrum parameters of
different brand or types of drones are very different. However,
the control frequency band is highly similar, except that the
coding is done to avoid collisions.
V. NLoS AND LoS THREAT COUNTERMEASURES
The existing UAV attack modes can be summarized
as non-line-of-sight (NLoS) and line-of-sight (LoS).
In NLoS attacks, the attacker sets the target and ADr will
fly according to the given coordinates. Such threats are easy
to implement, and the operator may have left the location of
takeoff location. The ADr itself does not contain redundant
information and acts as a pawn to implement the threat or a
terrorist attack. In LoS mode, the ADr attacks being within
the range of the operator’s vision. Due to the limitations of
amateur ADr console power and state regulations, amateur
drones mostly fly within a limited range. There is no mali-
cious but curious threat likely to occur in this mode. Such
threats are often more intelligent because of the presence
of human controllers. The NLoS threat has a long history.
There were balloon bombs during the world wars, setting the
initiation time and taking off from the upper airside. Though
blind but can make panic because you do not know where
ADr will go next. For such threats, the main countermeasures
are surveillance and misleading.
We try to deal with a shadow noise (war fog). The setup
is shown in Fig. 5 (a) where a GPS antenna is erected in
the target area (blue grid), the real target area is covered
from the GPS signal emitted by the satellite, and the local
coordinates are projected to other regions (time-variation).
NLoS ADr cannot reach the target area according to the
instruction. Because the coordinates are always changing,
the wandering behavior of itself (irregular, multiple transfor-
mation direction of flight) has become the intrusion detection
feature. Intrusion detection is divided into logical or practical,
a forward-lookingWSN intrusion detection logic is presented
in [12]. Because civilian GPS does not take certification [2],
such strategies can be deployed at a small cost. The embedded
development board and a sufficiently long GPS antenna to
implement the response (a long enough GPS antenna can
ensure that the ‘‘war fog’’ affects the sky rather than other
normal services on the ground) are shown in Fig.5 (b). A spec-
trum analyzer adjusted to the GPS mode is monitoring the
GPS signal from the satellite, confirming that the deployed
projection noise does not affect ground services.
The LoS threat can cause trouble more accurately. Techni-
cal means can fool large number of low-level ADr attacks
but not carefully prepared malicious attackers. As shown
in Fig. 2, the SDr monitors the 2.4/5 GHz flight control
signal in the Demilitarized Zone. If any strange signal is
broadcasted, it is certain that there is new UAV launch (set as
an ADr). At the same time, the leaky cable lies on the ground
and launches high frequency electromagnetic wave. The
SDr acts as an air base station receiving the electromagnetic
wave. Due to a certain direction, the electromagnetic wave
will become an electromagnetic wall. An object reaching near
to this wall or passing through it will have a great impact
on the channel condition as discussed earlier. Considering
the SDr is a very important air hub, the airtime will greatly
affect the performance of the whole system. Through the
SDr carries a large capacity rechargeable battery itself,
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FIGURE 5. War fog, GPS coordinate mapping changes over time.
a hybrid approach having low-frequency radio wave energy
harvesting can achieve remote non-contact energy supply to
increase the airtime significantly and enhance the effective-
ness of amateur drone surveillance. Although, the application
scenario is not completely same, the SDr energy harvest-
ing can follow principles as laid out for wireless body area
networks [13].
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The rise of unmanned aerial vehicles will bring a brighter
future, but need careful consideration of safety, privacy and
regulatory issues, which will gradually, perfected as the tech-
nology matures.
This paper introduces a regulated drone surveillance sys-
tem based on the antenna and radio wave propagation. In fact,
from this point of view, the UAVs still have a lot of work
worth doing such as analysis of UAV spectrum data and
effective interference mitigation are all open issues. Mili-
tary or specially designed drones are not within the scope of
this article due to non-availability of data. It is experimentally
observed that in contrast to the 2.4/5 GHz crowded frequency
band, high frequency bands (60 GHz or even higher) seems
more suitable for commercial UAV control because the air
itself can bring high path loss, can limit UAV flight area,
almost cannot be out of sight (which is enough for enter-
tainment applications). The enduring UAV can be open to
universities, research institutions and certified users to avoid
a lot of air management problems.
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